Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) provide financial services to the poor, and resemble banks and non-profits. They explicitly target women because more women than men are poor especially in rural areas. While on the level of the MFIs' clients, self-help groups have demonstrated that poor women manage money better than men, little is known about how female CEOs manage their institutions. Since studies show that female CEOs in some financial institutions deliver better results than male CEOs, we ask if MFIs with women CEOs are better at serving the poor without jeopardizing financial sustainability. We first adapt the banking approach to managerial efficiency to account for the outreach and sustainability goals of the MFIs. We use panel data from 250 MFIs from across the world for the period 1998-2011 to estimate the technical efficiency in MFIs. Next, we evaluate if our outreach efficiency differs by the gender of the CEO and find that, in rural markets, MFIs with female CEOs have 12-14 percent points higher outreach efficiency. Our results suggest that promoting gender diversity at the top of the MFIs is likely to have social and financial benefits.
Introduction
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) provide financial services to the poor and have two goals. Like non-profit organizations, MFIs have a mission to serve as many poor clients as possible (the outreach goal). Like banks, MFIs have to be financially self-sustainable and earn profits or at least cover their costs (the financial sustainability goal). Most MFIs explicitly target women because more women than men are poor, especially in rural areas where cultural norms make it harder for women to borrow and save (D'Espallier et al., 2013) . The literature on nongovernment organizations (NGOs) suggests that female managers' style may be associated with better outreach, while recent work on gender and finance shows that female CEOs may deliver better results in some financial firms. Motivated by these findings, we ask if women are better bankers to the poor and explore the relationship between the CEO's gender and the outreach and the sustainability of MFIs serving rural areas. While gender diversity among top managers may be desirable because it is fair, we ask if there are efficiency gains from such diversity in rural microfinance.
On the client side, there are efficiency-based arguments for enhancing women' access to credit because household production efficiency decreases by as much as 10 percent when women are unable to meet their credit needs (Fletschner, 2008) . The 2012 World Bank Development Report devoted to Gender Equality and Development points out that gender differences in income and well-being are especially pronounced in women engaged in agriculture and (micro-) entrepreneurship, which are two of the most likely MFI client activities in rural areas. Rural women also have secondary status to men, as well as more limited property rights and access to assets and credit (Deere, 2003; Meinzen-Dick, 1997; Amber, 2011) . While these differences are valid for clients, they may also affect the selection of MFI leadership and thus affect the performance of the institution if female CEOs are as good as, or better than, men at banking the poor. An evaluation of the effectiveness of female managers of rural microfinance institutions contributes arguments for expanding the pool of potential managers to include more women and for decreasing the bias against women in rural area.
Evidence from rural India shows that exposure to effective actions of women in power changes, albeit slowly, people's bias against female leaders (Beaman et al., 2009) . Since women in power tend to promote other female leaders, evaluating if female CEOs run their MFIs efficiently may lead to expanding the opportunities available to all women (Matsa and Miller, 2011) In this article, we first adapt the banking approach to managerial efficiency to account for the outreach and sustainability goals of Microfinance Institutions. Next, using panel data with over 250 MFIs from across the world for the period 1998-2009, we evaluate whether our outreach efficiency differs by the CEOs gender. We find that in rural markets, MFIs with female CEOs have 12-14 point higher outreach efficiency suggesting that promoting diversity at the top is likely to have social and financial benefits.
Literature Review
Psychology and management studies find gender-based differences in behavior due to differences in risk taking, overconfidence, conservatism, ethical behavior, and diligence (Byrnes, et al., 1999; Nettle, 2007; Schmitt et al., 2008) . Recent behavioral economics literature also shows that economic behavior differs by gender because women are more averse to risk and competition and because their preferences are more situation-specific (Barber and Odean, 2001; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Niederle, and Vesterlund, 2007) .
Empirical evidence supports gender-based differences in financial and business decision making (Sunden, and Surette, 1998; Hoppe and Korb, 2013) . According to recent work, some of the differences may persist as the focus shifts from an average woman to financial experts like female CEOs of financial institutions. For example, female mutual fund managers are found to be as overconfident as men but maintain the gender specific higher aversion to risk and competition (Beckmann and Menkhoff, 2008) . While performance of mutual funds with female CEOs may not differ from that of male managed funds, female CEOs have more consistent performance over time suggesting that female managers' past performance is a better indicator of future performance (Lofton, 2011) . According to the Hedge Fund Research Inc., female hedge fund managers' return outperforms that for the industry as a whole.
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In the food and agribusiness industry in the U.S. and abroad, the success of high-profile female executives such as Patricia Woertz of ADM and Indra Nooyi of PepsiCo makes female leaders more visible. Few agricultural economics studies have focused on evaluating possible gender differences among financial experts in agriculture. We are aware of one study by Cunningham, et al. (2008) who evaluate whether women are better at marketing grain due to less overconfidence, which is measured by fewer trades. The results are that women trade less, but also store more, and therefore get lower prices. The authors conclude that men's greater number of trades is likely explained by men enjoying the trade more than women rather than by differences in overconfidence.
More broadly, female participation in leadership roles is advocated as a significant driver of firm performance (Oakley, 2000; Krishnan et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2006 ). An earlier metaanalysis by Eagley and Johnson (1990) shows differences in management style with women adopting a more democratic or participative style and less of an autocratic or directive style relative to their male counterparts. Similar characteristics are observed in leaders in non-profit institutions (Meinhard and Foster, 2003) . We do not know yet if such management styles and gender specific managerial characteristics affect the ability of MFIs to serve marginalized clients in rural areas and maintain financial sustainability of MFIs.
The bulk of the literature on leadership, gender and performance, especially in microfinance, focuses on women's presence on the board (of directors) and finds positive association between board gender diversity and performance in financial institutions serving marginalized clients (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Hartarska, 2005; Hartarska and Mersland, 2012; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2012; Strøm et al., forthcoming) .
The literature on CEOs' gender and MFI performance is scarcer. Unlike other financial institutions where women are leaders in at most 10% of the companies, in MFIs the proportion of women CEOs is relatively high and is 27% in our sample. There is some evidence, similar to evidence from other financial institutions, of a positive link between performance and female CEO, female Chair of the Board, and female directors (Carter et al., 2003; Mersland and Strom, 2009; Strøm et al, forthcoming) . The results are most often explained by a female CEOs' ability to better understand the needs of the customers the vast majority of whom are women.
Anticipating and meeting clients' needs seems important and evidence suggests that, in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, MFIs targeting more women have lower costs (Caudill et al., 2012) . Female loan officers have better capacity to build trustworthy relationship with borrowers and the loans they extend have lower probability to turn problematic (Beck et al., 2013) . In addition, relative to male clients, female clients are better at managing the money they borrow and save (D'Espallier et al., 2011) .
Targeting women to capture better repayment rates, however, may not translate into better profitability if better repayment rates are offset by the higher costs of female customers' smaller loans and savings size (D'Espallier et al., 2013) . This may be especially the case with deposit-mobilizing MFIs because those with (positive) scope economies from jointly lending and mobilizing deposits have fewer women on the board and are less likely to have a female Chair . However, Hartarska (2005) reports a positive link between female CEOs and MFIs' ability to reach poorer borrowers (depth of outreach) in Eastern Europe.
The evidence seems to suggest that the double bottom line may be behind reported advantages (or their lack) for female managers and MFI performance. Therefore, an evaluation of the effectiveness of female managers in running their institutions must fully account for the double bottom line of reaching as many poor clients as possible while maintaining financial selfsustainability. We do exactly that by using a productivity method that accounts for the two objectives.
Method
The banking efficiency literature argues that, after directly accounting for input prices, output quantity, technology-specific factors and country characteristics, the remaining inefficiency is managerial (Berger and Mester, 1997; Bos and Kool, 2006; DeYoung et al., 2001) . To test if women are better bankers for the poor, we follow this literature and first estimate a stochastic frontier (cost) function and, in a second step, evaluate if in rural areas the individual technical efficiency coefficients differ by the CEO's gender.
A structured approach to efficiency involves estimating either a profit or a cost function.
For the microfinance industry, the cost function is preferable because, while some MFIs are notfor-profit, all strive to minimize cost. Furthermore, the cost function is more appropriate for the cases when firms are price takers in the input markets (labor and capital) and have some market power in the output (financial services) market (Varian, 1984) . MFIs have market power in serving the poor because there are limited alternative sources of funds. At the same time, markets for MFIs' inputs such as physical assets, financial capital, and salaries for skilled labor are, by and large, competitive.
We adapt the production approach to efficiency in banking which is appropriate for nontraditional financial institutions and accommodate the dual objective of MFIs (Van Cayseele and Wuyts, 2007; . Microfinance studies have shown that, when outputs are measured as the number of clients served (borrowers and savers), the resulting individual technical efficiency coefficients capture the efficiency in serving as many poor clients as possible (Hartarska et al., 2010 .
We first estimate a stochastic translog cost frontier of the form:
where C is total cost, y k are outputs, p j are input prices,
and are parameters to be estimated, u ln is the inefficiency term assumed to be one-sided (half-normally distributed), and lnv is . In cross-country banking efficiency studies, country-specific factors are typically accounted for and we include country controls (Wu et al., 2012) . Estimation of financial institutions must also account for the credit risk typically measured by non-performing loan ratios . 3 We control for the level of risk using a variable measuring the ratio of loans overdue more than 30 days to total portfolio, which is a standard ratio used by
MFIs to measure credit risk. Further, following Caudill et al., (2009) (Hartarska et al., 2012a&b; Hartarksa et al., 2013) . Also consistent with previous work, we find that how we measure the outreach aspects of MFIs' output matters. The coefficient on the output is about 0.8 when output is measured by the number of active clients and about 0.7 when output is measured as the number of active borrowers. MFIs would be operating at minimum cost or at constant return to scales (optimal scale) if the estimated coefficient on the output was one. The lower this coefficient, the further away from the minimum cost the industry is. Thus, the results indicate that measuring only the lending output by the number of borrowers would suggest that MFIs must grow to achieve minimum per unit costs. If we account for the fact that some MFIs also provide savings services and use the number of clients as the output measure, we would conclude that MFIs must also grow to achieve optimal scale but to a smaller extent. Thus, MFIs may be more efficient when providing both loans and deposits and perhaps that to achieve optimal scale lending only MFIs have to grow more than lending and savings MFIs. This result is consistent with findings of scope economies in microfinance (Hartarska et al., 2010; Hartarska et al., 2011) .
[ All control factors included in addition to those implied by the traditional cost function are also statistically significant with one percent higher portfolio at risk associated with 35 percent higher costs and one additional year of MFI's age associated with one percent higher costs. Thus, for this sample we find that costs do not fall but increase slightly over time. This is likely due to the higher costs associated with reaching more marginal (pooper) clients as the MFIs expand with age.
Next, we look at the regressions that test for differences in outreach efficiency by the CEO's gender to evaluate whether female-led MFIs are more efficient in reaching active clients relative to male-led MFIs. These results are presented in table 3. We are interested in the results for MFIs serving rural financial markets. 5 The results show that outreach efficiency in female-led
MFIs serving rural markets is higher by 14 percent points when output is measured by the number of active clients and by 12 percent points when output is measured by the number of active borrowers. We also find that the CEO's gender seems to explain a very large part of the variation in efficiency, in particular in rural areas (R-square is 0.67 & 0.62).
[ In MFIs serving both rural and urban markets, when outreach is measured by the number of active clients, there is no statistically significant difference in technical efficiency by the CEOs' gender (although the standard errors are relatively small). However, we find 5 percent significant difference in the efficiency coefficients when output is measured by the number of active borrowers in the stochastic frontier function. It is possible that these results reflect the fact that much fewer MFIs offering savings products have female CEOs. Alternatively the results may suggest that gender related advantages are valid for MFIs specializing in serving rural markets only. We also test the difference in efficiency by gender of the CEO in MFIs serving only urban market and find 13 to 14 percent point higher efficiency for female-led MFIs serving urban markets only.
Conclusion
The financial literature has shown that in some financial industries, female managers can deliver better results than male managers while the microfinance literature argues that women may manage money better because female clients repay their loans better than male clients, and female loan officers generate better repayment rates. With this work, we draw attention to the potential for advantages related to the CEOs' gender and organizational performance in microfinance.
We focus on the simple task: can we find a relation between female leaders of MFIs and these institutions' performance measured along two dimensions -financial sustainability and outreach in rural markets. 0.19*** 0.32 Note: *** mean difference statistically significant at 1%, ** mean difference statistically significant at 5%, * mean difference statistically significant at 10%. Note: *** mean difference statistically significant at 1%, ** mean difference statistically significant at 5%, * mean difference statistically significant at 10%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at 10%. The technical efficiency is computed from models where the output is measured by the number of clients or the number of borrowers. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, *** significant at 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at 10%.
